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Is China a single united market for foreign investors? – Federalism, 
Chinese style and inward foreign direct investment in China 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Whilst existing research on the locational determinants of inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China and Federalism, Chinese style makes important contributions to the literature 
in its own right, there has been a lack of formal econometric work in the literature to 
systematically quantify the relationship between Federalism, Chinese style and location 
choice of foreign investors in China. This study develops a spatial dynamic model that 
explicitly addresses spatial externalities and path-dependent effects of inward FDI and host 
location attractiveness, in examining the spatial distribution of inward FDI in China under 
Federalism, Chinese style. An empirical application of this model to a dataset of inward FDI 
across Chinese provinces over 1997-2012 shows that the location of FDI in China is 
determined by a combination of negative spatial externalities and positive path-dependent 
effects of FDI, and different host regional characteristics. This result implies that the Chinese 
market is highly fragmented for foreign investors.  
 
Key words: Inward Foreign direct investment; Federalism, Chinese style; Multinational 
enterprises; Spatial dynamic model
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1 Introduction 
 
The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China has played a vital role in both 
China’s economic development and its integration into the global trade system. Starting from 
a base of less than USD 21 billion in 1990, the stock of FDI in China rose to over USD 1,221 
billion by the end of 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016), which put China into the top two among all 165 
developing economies, next to Hong Kong and third among the 21 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) member economies1 only to the United States and Hong Kong. China 
has become the world’s largest exporter of goods since 2009 and the world’s number one 
trading nation by overtaking the US since 2013, with a trade volume of over US$4.3 trillion 
in 2014 (WTO, 2015). The rapid rise of China as a global trade power since the early 1990s 
has been, in large part, a direct result of FDI inflow on such a large scale. The share of 
exports by foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) in China dramatically increased from only 1.1% 
in 1985 to 45.9% in 2014 (MOFCOM, 1992; NBS, 2015).  
 Due to the above facts, since the 1990s, China has been known as the “world’s 
factory”. Despite being the “world’s factory” at the national level, the regional distribution of 
inward FDI has been highly uneven across Chinese provinces. The consequence of such a 
trend makes China a highly-fragmented marketplace for foreign investors. By the end of 1997, 
the number of registered FFEs and the amount of their investment in the coastal region were 
4.1 and 5.2 times larger than those in the inland region, respectively.2 Comparing the above 
indicators per province in the costal and the inland regions, the gap between these two 
regions has been wider. The coastal region is 7.1 and 9 times larger than the inland region in 
terms of the number of registered FFEs and the amount of their investment per province 
respectively (Calculated based on NBS, 1999). With the aim of narrowing the regional 
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economic gap between China’s coastal and inland regions, China implemented the “Great 
Western Development” strategy in 1999 and the “Northeast China Revitalization” plan in 
2003, and one of the major efforts has been to attract foreign investors in China’s inland 
regions that had not enjoyed the economic benefits of China’s initial open door policy. 
However, after a decade of the strategy, the gap of inward FDI activities between the two 
regions remains large. By the end of 2012, the number of registered FFEs and the amount of 
their investment in the coastal region were 4.4 and 4.8 times larger than those in the inland 
region respectively. Using these indicators per province, the coastal region is 7.6 and 8.2 
times larger than the inland region in terms of the number of registered FFEs and the amount 
of their investments respectively (Calculated based on NBS, 2014). 
 Given the prominent contribution of FDI to China’s emergence as a global trade 
power and spatially uneven distribution of inward FDI, much scholarly work has been 
undertaken on the topic of location choice of foreign investors in China (e.g., Head and Rise, 
1996; Wei et al., 1999; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Zhang, 2001; Sun 
et al., 2002; Fung et al., 2002 and 2005; He, 2006; Zheng, 2011; Sharma et al., 2014; and 
Liang, 2015 among others). There have been two most commonly mentioned driving forces 
affecting FDI location choice in China. The first driving force is a China specific policy on 
inward FDI. In parallel with other areas of policy, the evolution of China’s FDI policy has 
been characterized as pragmatic and incremental in terms of permitted locations, entry mode 
and permitted industry. Through preferential tax treatment and other measures, China’s FDI 
policy has encouraged foreign investors to invest in selected industries, to use the desired 
entry mode, and to move into permitted locations (Tian, 2007). By doing so, FDI locations 
initially selected served as a test platform for China’s economic reform (Naughton, 2007). 
The second driving force is the heterogeneity of regional factors across Chinese provinces. 
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Variations in regional factors such as market size, income level, infrastructure, human capital, 
labour cost, and other endowments determine the attractiveness of a province as a destination 
for FDI. Empirical studies of this perspective argue that the reason FDI has mainly been in 
coastal provinces in China is due to their relatively strong locational advantages compared 
with inland provinces, the benefits of which can be reaped by foreign invested firms (Head 
and Rise, 1996; Zheng, 2011; Liang, 2015).  
 However, these two driving forces discussed above do not fully explain the spatial 
distribution of inward FDI in China. A remaining puzzle is the consistently widening gap of 
inward FDI between Chinese provinces, despite China’s effort to narrow regional economic 
inequality by attracting foreign investments in the inland region. This study argues that 
China’s specific institutional environment should be taken into account. Local protectionism 
and inter-regional competition for attracting foreign investments under Federalism, Chinese 
style, have played an important role in shaping a consistent trend of uneven spatial 
distribution of inward FDI across Chinese regions. Local protectionism and inter-regional 
competition among Chinese local governments has been a topical issue in China for years and 
has attracted much attention in both academic and policy arenas (Young, 2000; Wedeman, 
2003; Bai et al., 2004, 2008; Poncet, 2005; Fang et al., 2013). Whilst existing research on the 
locational determinants of FDI in China and Federalism, Chinese style makes important 
contributions to the literature in its own right, there is a lack of research on the relationship 
between these two. In particular, there has been a lack of formal econometric work in the 
literature to quantify the relationship between Federalism, Chinese style and location choice 
of foreign investors in China. The only exception is He (2006) to my knowledge, which 
quantitatively examines how the process of regional decentralization relates to FDI ﬂows in 
the Chinese provinces. However, the author measures various types of decentralization as 
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static outcomes within a province rather than a dynamic process of inter-regional competition 
for attracting foreign investors. As such, proxies for decentralizations used in He (2006) can 
be interpreted as other indicators.  
 Considering the substantial importance of China as one of the world’s top 
destinations for foreign investors, a better understanding of the FDI location choice of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in relation to the China-specific institutional environment 
would provide guidance to Chinese policy makers in identifying FDI policy priorities, and 
would also help MNEs in the formation and modification of their FDI location choice 
strategies in China. 
 This study aims to fill this important niche. The primary purpose of this study is to 
examine the mechanisms and driving forces determining MNEs’ FDI location choices in 
China. It pays special attention to MNEs’ responses to one of China’s specific institutional 
environments - Federalism, Chinese style. To assess the impact of Federalism, Chinese style 
on FDI location choice of foreign investors in China, this study draws insights from a broad 
range of theoretical literature and develops an underlying model that explicitly addresses 
spatial externalities and path-dependent effects of inward FDI and location attractiveness 
under Federalism, Chinese style. Two hypotheses are constructed. The first hypothesis 
suggests that local protectionism and inter-regional competition for attracting FDI will lead to 
a negative spatial externality of inward FDI. The second hypothesis suggests that the nature 
of the Chinese government’s policies towards foreign investment - seeking incremental and 
marginal progress in terms of entry modes, location entry and industry entry - will lead to a 
positive path dependent effect of inward FDI. The dataset for the testing consists of a panel of 
30 provinces and municipalities within the period of 1997-2012. The estimator this study 
employs is the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The system GMM 
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is capable of correcting for the potential endogeneity of temporally and spatially lagged 
inward FDI variables and other explanatory variables, and allows for unobserved region-
specific effects and measurement errors. The estimating results support both hypotheses by 
showing a negative spatial externality and a self-reinforcement tendency of inward FDI with 
respect to FDI location in China. Along with different location characteristics across Chinese 
provinces, these results explain why the spatial distribution of inward FDI in China has still 
been uneven despite a decade of efforts to attract FDI in the inland region of China. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines Federalism, Chinese 
style and its implications for inward FDI in China, and develops the underlying model by 
incorporating temporal and spatial dynamics of MNEs’ FDI location choice in China. Section 
3 defines the key variables and describes the techniques used to estimate - the System GMM 
estimator. Section 4 estimates the models using the System GMM estimator and reports the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the academic and policy implications of the 
findings and presents concluding remarks.  
 
2 Federalism, Chinese style – The institutional driving force of regional competition for 
FDI 
 
One of the most prominent institutional features of China’s reform in promoting transition 
towards a market economy is a decentralized, multi-layered, multi-regional governance 
structure with a hard budget constraint, which is often described as “Federalism, Chinese 
style” (Weingast et al., 1995; Cao et al., 1999). As a regulator of the local economy, local 
governments issued business licenses, coordinated local business developments, determined 
the structure of local expenditure, and engaged in tax policies (Qian, 1999; Zhao and Zhang, 
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1999; Wei, 2000; He, 2006). There are two implications of Chinese federalism for inward 
FDI in China. The first implication is the interregional competition for FDI. Given the 
immobility of domestic capital and financial market inefficiency in China, foreign capital is 
an important source for tax revenue generation and financing local development, implying 
that local officials are in competition to attract FDI and would like to offer competing 
packages of preferential policies (Naughton, 2007). As local governments increased their 
regulatory powers during the reform, they have strong incentives to attract foreign investors 
through lowering taxes, even beyond the statutory concessions specified in national level 
regulation, as long as FIEs increase tax revenue and boost employment (OECD, 2003). The 
second implication is local protectionism. Inter-regional competition provides local 
governments with incentives to take the form of using regional barriers on interregional trade 
and domestic capital flows to protect local businesses, profitable industries, and economic 
interests, such as sustaining employment and maximizing tax revenues and non-tax benefits 
(Cannon and Zhang, 1996; Lee, 1998; Wedeman, 2003; Bai el al., 2004; He et al., 2008). For 
this reason, the Chinese market has been described as a collection of fragmented markets, 
reflecting the fact that China’s factor and product markets are poorly integrated across 
different political jurisdictions of the country (Walder, 1995; Lee, 1998; Young, 2000; Huang, 
2003). Given the high barriers on interregional trade and capital flows, and the central 
government’s efforts to impose hard budget constraints on local governments, FDI provides a 
substitute mechanism for China’s inefficient financial system of allocating investment funds. 
Moreover, the option for local governments to improve product quality is to attract foreign 
firms with their advanced managerial knowledge and technology (Huang, 2003).  
 
3 Hypothesis development 
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3.1 Underlying model 
The underlying model of this study is a spatial dynamic model that integrates three important 
elements in explaining the spatial distribution of inward FDI in China: (i) spatial externalities 
of FDI; (ii) path-dependency of FDI; and (iii) host regional characteristics. Following stock 
adjustment of Chow (1967) and Cheng and Kwan (2000), this study assumes that the stock of 
investment, k  adjusts partially toward its desired level with the following discrete process, 
using lower case letters for the natural logs of variables: 
( ) .10          ,1,*1, <<−=− −− λλ tiittiit kkkk                               (1) 
The equilibrium or desired FDI stock in province i is also dependent on the desired stock in 
the neighbouring provinces:  
ititit
*
itt,i
*
it XWkkk ε+θ+δ+π+⋅ρ+α= −1 .                                   (2) 
Where W refers to a (N × N) spatial weight matrix describing the spatial arrangement of 
the N regions concerned and wjk the (j, k)th element of W, where j and k = 1, ···, N. The off-
diagonal elements of W are first defined as wjk = 1/djk where djk is the distance between the 
capital city of province j and that of province k, with k ≠ j. This W is then row-normalized so 
that each row sums to unity. itWk can be interpreted as a proximity-weighted average of 
inward FDI stock into neighbouring provinces. 1, −tik represents path-dependent effect of 
inward FDI stock. itX  refers to the vector of host location variables, capturing standard 
regional variables for the host provinces. Combining equations (1) and (2) we obtain:  
( ) ( ) 1111 −−−− λ−ε+θ+δ+π+α⋅λ⋅ρ−=− t,iitititt,it,iit kXkWIkk ,               
which can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 −− ρ−⋅λ−+ε+θ+δ+π+α⋅λ=ρ− t,iitititt,iit kWIXkkWI .             (3) 
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This leads to: 
itititt,iitt,iit
~~~~XWkWkkk ε+θ+δ+π+β+β+β= −− 13211 ,                          (4) 
in which λα+λ−=β 11 , ρ=β2 , ( )ρλ−−=β 13 .  
 
3.2 Spatial externalities 
itWk in Equation (2) implies a spatial dependence of MNEs’ FDI locations, where the amount 
of inward FDI stock in one location partially depends upon inward FDI stock in neighbouring 
locations. Agglomerative forces of FDI in terms of specialized labour, infrastructure, and 
knowledge spillover may create positive spatial externalities, leading to higher FDI levels 
(Blonigen et al., 2007; Hall and Petroulas, 2008). However, in the context of China, the 
implication of inter-jurisdictional competition for the pattern of inward FDI location choices 
may differ from the conventional view of positive agglomeration effects, and rather it leads to 
negative spatial externalities. A body of empirical studies has indicated evidence of the 
existence and importance of local protectionism and inter-regional trade barriers in China 
(Young, 2000; Poncet, 2005; He et al., 2008). Young (2000) finds increasing similarity in the 
structure of economic activities across Chinese provinces, implying a rise of local 
protectionism. Using the inter-provincial trade flow of 21 comparable industries based on the 
provincial input-output tables of 1992 and 1997, Poncet (2005) supports the idea of a 
growing economic fragmentation in China by showing a decrease of inter-provincial trade 
intensity in addition to an increase of intra-provincial trade intensity between 1992 and 1997. 
The tariff-equivalent of crossing a border between a province and the rest of the country 
amounts to 48% and 53% in 1992 and 1997, respectively, being significantly higher than the 
value of 15% found for internal trade in the US and Canada. Using industrial-provincial data 
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between 1980-2003, He et al. (2008) examines the relationship between decentralization 
driven protectionism and industrial distribution. Their empirical findings support the 
argument that local protectionism has hindered industrial specialization. Although Coughlin 
and Segev (2000) and Sharma et al. (2014) apply spatial econometric models to analyze FDI 
location Choice in China, the choice of empirical model is not based on a theoretical model 
that systematically combines the relationship between Federalism, Chinese style and China 
specific inward FDI policies, to account for an uneven distribution of FDI across Chinese 
provinces. 
As described in Section 2, if inter-regional trade barriers and inter-regional 
competitions for inward FDI among provinces are so high that agglomeration effects cannot 
spill over, FDI in one province may be negatively influenced by FDI in neighbouring 
provinces, resulting in a win-lose game among provinces for receiving FDI. These 
explanations lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
H1. Under Federalism, Chinese style, the FDI stock in a focal region will be negatively 
related to the FDI stock in its neighbouring regions. 
 
3.3 Path dependency 
1, −tik in equation (1) captures a path dependent effect of FDI. In line with aspects of the new 
economic geography, the FDI location choice is not a single static decision function, but a 
dynamic one, indicating that current FDI location choice is partly a response to those in 
previous periods (Head et al., 1995; Barry et al., 2003). Since foreign firms face greater 
uncertainties than domestic firms in the host country, they typically have a strong tendency to 
follow previous investors because these investors can be represented as a signal of reliability 
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of a certain FDI destination (Barry et al., 2003). Such a path dependent process of FDI has 
been tested (Head and Ries, 1996; Cheng and Kwan, 2000, Zheng, 2011) and they provide 
empirical evidence for a positive self-reinforcing effect of inward FDI. In line with the theory 
of incremental internationalization, the previous FDI experiences provide options or 
platforms for sequential FDIs into a given location and give a chance to accumulate an 
experiential knowledge of foreign markets, which increases the level of resource 
commitments to overseas investments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Davison, 1980; Kogut, 
1983; Chang, 1995; Shaver et al., 1997; Delios and Henisz, 2003). In the context of China, 
the consistently uneven spatial distribution of inward FDI stems from the China specific FDI 
policy, which further strengthens the path dependency of MNEs’ FDI location choices in 
China. Through a strategy of “experimental” reform, FDI was attracted and confined to the 
coastal region as an initial laboratory from the beginning of China’s open door policy in 1979, 
and this discrimination against inland western regions has lasted for at least a decade, despite 
a gradual liberalization of the regulation of inward FDI in terms of the location entry (OECD, 
2002). A key policy injection in this laboratory was the establishment of various special zones 
with lower tax rates, fewer and simplified administrative and customs procedures, and duty-
free import of components and supplies. In 1979, the first set of “Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs)” in Guangdong province (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou) and in Fujian (Xiamen) 
was established. Then, along the coastline, fourteen new “Open Cities” were opened in 1984 
and all set up Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs). In 1985, broad 
scopes of regions were opened to FDI, including the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, the 
Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai and Min River Delta in south Fujian. Furthermore, 
Shandong and Liaoning peninsulas and the Bohai Sea Coastal Region were opened to foreign 
investment and Hainan Island became China’s fifth SEZ in 1988. At the beginning of the 
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1990s, another SEZ - Pudong Development Zone - in Shanghai was established and eighteen 
new ETDZs were approved in 1992-1993. During the same period, the regional scope of 
special zones started expanding to cities in the north and inland. Between 1992 and 1993 
China opened thirteen border cities, all the capital cities of inland provinces and ten interior 
cities along the Yangtze River. These cities were given the same preferential policy as the 
coastal open cities. Since 2000, China has strengthened the “Great Western Development” 
strategy to expand the success of the “special zones” policy in the coastal region to the inland 
region (Naughton, 2007). Such a variation in the government’s preferential FDI policies 
among regions in China is one of the main driving forces of the uneven regional distribution 
of FDI, which further widens regional income and economic development inequalities in 
China (Wei et al., 1999; He, 2006; Zheng, 2011).    
If we assume the selective and incremental approach of China’s FDI policies and a win-
lose game among provinces for attracting inward FDI under Federalism, Chinese style, 
regions which attracted FDI in the first round will attract more FDI (e.g., Coastal regions), 
whilst regions which attracted low inward FDI in the initial round will have decreased 
chances of attracting FDI as time unfolds, indicating a path dependent effect of inward FDI in 
China. This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
 
H2. Under Federalism, Chinese style and the selective approach of China’s policies towards 
FDI, the current FDI stock in a focal region will be positively related to the previous FDI 
stock in the same region. 
 
4 Empirical model specification and estimation method 
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4.1 Empirical model specification 
Empirical model specification of Eq (4) is a spatial dynamic panel model as follows: 
.                         
)ln()()ln()ln(
4
1,321,1
ititit
tiStockitStocktiStockitStock
VariablesonHostLocati
FDIWFDIWFDIFDI
εθδβ
βββ
+++
+⋅+⋅+= −−        (5) 
To measure inward FDI stock in China, which is the dependent variable in the model, this 
study uses the logarithm of the accumulated investment of foreign funded enterprises in 
region i and year t [ itStockFDI )ln( ]. Data used in estimations is a panel of 30 provinces and 
municipalities over the period 1998-2012. Among all 31 provinces and municipalities in 
China, Tibet is excluded mainly because of data unavailability. There are three independent 
variables. First, 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI refers to the path dependent effect of inward FDI stock. 
Second, itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ refers to spatial externalities of inward FDI stock. Third, 
1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW refers to the path dependent effect of FDI spatial externalities. The vector 
‘Host Location Variables’ captures the standard regional determinants of inward FDI, which 
will be specified in the next section; and the disturbance terms consist of the unobserved time 
effect that is common for all regions ( tδ ); the unobserved regional fixed effect that is 
constant over time ( iθ ), and the transitory errors )( itε  that may vary across regions and over 
time with a zero mean value. The data for inward FDI stock is obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook (various years) published by the National Bureau of Statistics in China. 
 
4.2 Host Location Variables 
‘Host Location Variables’ represent the key host regional characteristics. The literature of 
MNEs’ location decision on international business, economic geography, and international 
economics suggests that the spatially uneven distribution of FDI activities across countries or 
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regions in a given country derives from the presence of substantially different regional 
characteristics such as market size, income level, infrastructure, human capital, labour cost, 
and other endowments (Dunning, 1977; Markusen et al., 1996; Mucchieli and Mayer, 2004; 
Iammarino and McCann, 2013) and these regional factors are often heterogeneous and 
immobile across regions (Arthur 1994; Krugman 1991; Fujita and Thisse 2002). In line with 
the literature on the regional determinants of MNEs’ FDI location choice in China, this study 
incorporates four aspects of such host regional characteristics in empirical estimation. First, 
the host region market size is measured by the logarithm of gross regional product in the 
region i and year t and denoted as itGRPln . This study expects that the larger the market size 
of a host province is, other things being equal, the more inward FDI the province attracts 
because it provides investment opportunities for foreign investors who look for new markets 
or seek to maximize the expected revenue of their investment (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; 
Zhang, 2001; Sun et al., 2002; Fung et al., 2002 and 2005; Zheng, 2011; Sharma et al., 2014; 
Liang, 2015). Second, regional innovative capabilities are measured by the logarithm of the 
number of patent applications in the region i and year t and denoted as itPATENTln . The 
patents registered are considered as the output of regional knowledge production (Buesa et al., 
2010) and they are closely related with other input resources such as R&D expenses and 
human capital (Acs et al., 2002). This study expects that the higher level of regional 
innovative capabilities, the more inward FDI the province attracts because a region with 
higher innovative capabilities can provide more efficient and innovative ways to boost 
productivity for foreign investors. Third, this study uses two infrastructure variables 
measured by the logarithm of total length of railways and highways per 1000 square 
kilometers of landmass in the region i and year t and denoted as itRAILln and itROADln  
respectively. The existing literature on determinants of inward FDI in China finds that well-
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developed infrastructure with convenient transportation options can improve the effectiveness 
of MNE operations in the host region and reduce transport costs (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; 
Zhang, 2001; Sun et al., 2002; Fung et al., 2002 and 2005; Zheng, 2011). This study expects 
that a denser transportation network will lead to larger FDI inflow. Fourth, the quality of 
human capital is measured by a ratio of the number of students enrolled in higher educational 
institutions in the province i and year t to its population during the same period and denoted 
as itEDUln . Access to skilled labour in the host region is one of the key considerations for 
FDI location because FDI by MNEs typically leads to the advancement and innovations in 
production, management, and marketing activities in the host regions. A higher education 
level generally reflects the capability of employees to process and understand information 
and to cope with the new tasks and procedures required by foreign investors (OECD, 2002). 
Following existing empirical literature (Fung et al. 2002; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Liang, 
2015), this study predicts a positive relationship between the quality of human capital and 
inward FDI. The data for the above variables is obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook 
(various years). 
 
3.3 Estimation method 
This study uses a spatial dynamic panel regression with system GMM to address the 
endogeneity issue of serially and spatially lagged dependent variables. As pointed out by 
Hsiao (2003), the pooling OLS estimation of the coefficient ( 1β ) on a serially lagged 
dependent variable [ 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI ] is likely to produce inconsistent and upward-biased 
results, owing to the positive correlation between a time lagged dependent variable 
[ 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI ] and fixed effects ( iθ ). The inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent 
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variable [ itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ ] on the right-hand side of the model further causes simultaneity 
and endogeneity problems, which would make OLS estimators biased and inconsistent 
(Anselin 1988). Therefore, both the serially and spatially lagged dependent variables need to 
be treated as endogenous, and the proper estimation of their coefficients ( 1β and 2β ) should 
account for this endogeneity issue in an explicit manner.  
In addition to the endogeneity issue of serially and spatially lagged dependent variables, 
there is another potential endogeneity problem between inward FDI stock levels and one of 
our regional variables, regional innovative capabilities, itPATENTln . Some geographic 
regions may be attractive and conducive to both FDI and patent activities simultaneously. 
Furthermore, large inward FDI stock in a given region may attract innovative activities (e.g., 
R&D laboratories) to the region. As such, a lack of control of potential endogeneity issues 
may generate biased and inconsistent empirical results. One possible way to address the 
potential endogeneity problem is to identify suitable instrumental variables (IVs) that are 
highly correlated with the endogenous variables, but not correlated with the error term, and 
then run IV regressions. In most cases, however, it is not easy to find the instruments 
equipped with such ideal properties. The difference GMM method can deal with this joint 
endogeneity issue by using the level of the lagged terms of endogenous variables as 
instrumental variables after first differencing, because these lagged variables are very 
unlikely to be correlated with the error term after the first-difference (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) shows that if the series are persistent, difference 
GMM performs poorly because past levels convey little information about future changes and 
thus are difficult to instrument. The system GMM method suggested in Blundell and Bond 
(1998) handles this weak instrument problem by adding moment conditions and combining 
‘the original level equation’ and ‘the difference equation’ as a system of equations, with first-
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differences instrumented on lagged levels and with levels instrumented on first differences. 
By doing so, the system GMM makes instruments exogenous to the fixed effects and 
increases efficiency. Monte-Carlo investigations in Kukenova and Monteiro (2008) suggest 
that an application of the system GMM to spatial dynamic panel models (e.g., Eq. (5)) deals 
with the joint endogeneity problem of serial and spatial dependences and corrects for the 
potential endogeneity of other explanatory variables.  
To guarantee that the selected set of lagged level and first-differenced values of the 
explanatory variables are valid and relevant instruments in the regression, this paper conducts 
and reports three validity tests: (1) Hansen’s J test of over-identifying restrictions to test for 
the overall validity of the IVs; (2) Difference-in-Hansen tests with the number of instruments 
reported (Roodman, 2009); and (3) first-order AR(1) and second-order AR(2) serial 
correlation tests in the first-differenced residuals. If the original error terms are not serially 
correlated, AR(1) should be significant and AR(2) should be insignificant. In addition to the 
validity tests, a finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) is applied. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the variable and Table 2 
reports the results of Eq. (5) using the System GMM estimator. Due to the high correlation 
between itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ and 1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW  (r = 0.99), they are included in a 
separate regression model specification in Table 2 [Models 1-4 are based on using 
itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ and Models 5-8 are based on using 1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW ]. Among control 
variables, because correlations between itGRPln and itPATENTln , and between 
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itRAILln and itROADln are high (r = 0.94 and 0.76 respectively), they are also included in a 
separate model specification in Table 2 [Models 1-2 and 5-6 are based on using itGRPln , and 
Models 3-4 and 7-8 are based on using itPATENTln ; Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 are based on 
using itRAILln and Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 are based on using itROADln ]. The last four rows 
in Table 2 show that the system GMM estimation passes all the specification tests of 
Hansen’s J, Difference-in-Hansen, the first-order and second-order serial correlation tests, 
indicating that the IVs selected in the regression are statistically valid and the original error 
terms are not serially correlated. 
 Several important findings can be spelled out. First, the coefficients on five host 
locational variables are all statistically significant and have the expected signs except human 
capital variable ( itEDUln ) in models 3, 4, 7 and 8 in Table 2, in which coefficients of 
itEDUln are statistically insignificant. This empirical evidence thus suggests that provinces 
that are characterized by a larger host market size ( itGRPln ), a higher level of innovation 
capabilities ( itPATENTln ), a more developed transportation infrastructure ( itRAILln and 
itROADln ), and more educated human capital ( itEDUln ) lead to a higher level of inward FDI. 
In detail, the coefficient of host market size variable ( itGRPln ) across models are between 
0.235 (Model 2) and 0.452 (Model 1), indicating that a 1% increase of market size in a host 
province is likely to increase the amount of inward FDI stock in the same province by 
0.235% - 0.452%, and they are all statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient value 
of innovation capabilities ( itPATENTln ) ranges between 0.108 (Model 8) and 0.214 (Model 
3), indicating that a 1% increase of the number of patent applications in a host province is 
likely to increase the amount of inward FDI stock in the same region by 0.108% - 0.214%, 
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and they are all statistically significant at 1% level. The overall effect of road transport 
density on inward FDI stock is larger than that of rail transport density. The coefficient of the 
density of rail transport network ( itRAILln ) ranges 0.108 (Model 3) and 0.123 (Model 5), 
indicating that a 1% increase of density of rail transport network in a province is likely to 
increase the amount of inward FDI stock in the same region by 0.108% - 0.213%, and they 
are all statistically significant at 5% level. Meanwhile, the coefficient of the density of the 
road transport network ( itROADln ) on inward FDI stock ranges between 0.150 (Model 8) 
and 0.216 (Model 2), indicating that a 1% increase of road transport network density in a host 
province is likely to increase the amount of inward FDI stock in the same region by 0.150% - 
0.216%, and they are all statistically significant at either 1% level or 5% level. The 
coefficient of human capital variable ( itEDUln ) in models 1, 2, 5, and 6 is statistically 
significant at 5% and the size of the coefficient ranges between 0.165 (Model 2) and 0.224 
(Model 5), indicating that a 1% increase of the ratio of students enrolled in higher educational 
institutions over the total population in a host province is likely to increase the amount of 
inward FDI stock in the same region by 0.165% - 0.224%.  
 Secondly, it shows a win-lose game among Chinese provinces in attracting FDI 
through local protectionism. Consistent with Sharma et al. (2014), the coefficient of 
itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ and 1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW  are significantly negative for all eight model 
specifications, indicating that competition for attracting FDI among provinces is so high that 
it wipes out the spillover effects of agglomeration from FDI, and the interregional 
competition makes China a highly-fragmented market for foreign investors. In detail, the 
coefficient size of itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅ and 1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW range between -0.932 (Model 9) 
and -0.518 (Model 4), indicating that a 1% increase of both current and previous inward FDI 
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stock in the neighbouring provinces is likely to decrease the amount of current inward FDI 
stock in the focal province by 0.932% - 0.518%, and they are all statistically significant either 
at 1% or 5% level. All these estimations provide strong and robust support to Hypothesis 1. 
  Thirdly, it shows that the FDI location choice in China is highly dependent upon 
previous investment location choices of foreign investors. As suggested by Head and Ries 
(1996), Cheng and Kwan (2000) and Zheng (2011), the coefficient of 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI is 
positive and statistically significant across all model specifications, indicating strong self-
reinforcement effects of MNEs’ FDI location choices in China. The range of coefficient for 
previous inward FDI stock 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI is between 0.636 (Model 1) and 0.857 (Model 7), 
indicating that a 1% increase of previous inward FDI stock in a host province is likely to 
increase the amount of current inward FDI stock in the same region by 0.636% - 0.857%, and 
they are all statistically significant at 1% level. All these results support Hypothesis 2. 
 Together with a negative spatial externality of FDI created by Federalism, Chinese 
style, and a positive path-dependent effect of FDI which derives not only from geographical 
advantages enjoyed by the coastal regions in terms of transportation infrastructure and 
availability of skilled human capital, but also an incremental evolution of China’s FDI policy 
in terms of permitted location, this study provides a clue to the consistently high degree of 
spatially uneven distribution of inward FDI in China despite China’s effort to boost the 
poorer western inland parts of the country that have not enjoyed the economic benefits of 
China’s opening up to the outside world. This conclusion is consistent with Zheng (2011), 
indicating that the prime causes of the uneven regional distribution of FDI are variations in 
economic openness (government's preferential policies) and industrial and economic 
development in terms of market size, human resources, agglomeration, and infrastructure, 
which further widens income and economic development inequalities among the three macro-
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regions. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite a substantial body of literature on the issue of locational determinants of inward FDI 
in China, there has been a lack of econometric research based on a theoretical model to 
quantitatively assess MNE’s responses to the China-specific decentralized institutional 
environment when they determine FDI locations in China. This study has addressed this 
challenge and thus filled an important niche in the literature. 
 The underlying model is a spatial dynamic model that explicitly incorporates spatial 
externalities of inward FDI, path-dependent effects of inward FDI, and other major host 
regional characteristics. This study applies this spatial dynamic model to the dataset of 
inward FDI in Chinese provinces and municipalities over the period of 1997-2012. The 
estimations must address the joint endogeneity problem of the temporally and spatially 
lagged dependent variable, and thus this study employs the system GMM estimator to deal 
with this joint endogeneity problem and endogeneity issue of other explanatory variables.  
 Consistent with previous empirical literature on locational determinants of inward 
FDI in China, this study has found that foreign investors favor provinces characterized by 
large host market size, adequate transportation linkages, high level of innovation capabilities, 
and more educated human capital. However, empirical results of this study also reveal a 
negative impact of FDI spatial externalities while a positive impact of FDI path-dependency 
on the MNEs’ FDI location choice in China, and this combined result may explain the reason 
for maintaining a persistent gap between the coastal and inland regions in China, in terms of 
regional distribution of inward FDI.  
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 An interesting policy implication can be derived from this research. This study finds 
that the major reason for the consistently uneven distribution of inward FDI in China despite 
its effort to attract more FDI in the inland regions is a negative impact of inter-regional 
competition among Chinese provinces driven by Federalism, Chinese style. Under the China-
specific decentralized governance structure, although policies and regulations toward FDI 
carefully formulated by the central government under the “Great Western Development” 
strategy in 1999 and “Northeast China Revitalization” plan in 2003 are reasonable at national 
level, implementation of these FDI policies varies widely across different local governments 
due to their different local interests and regional competition for foreign investments. 
Therefore, the formulation of the preferential FDI policy aiming to narrow a regional gap of 
inward FDI alone may not be a sufficient condition. A policy which narrows a wide gap 
between the formulation of FDI policies and its implementation should also be present. 
Furthermore, a series of complementary policies and regulations should be introduced 
together with the FDI policy, such as promoting both domestic and foreign investment in 
developing transportation infrastructure, strengthening regional education and training 
institutions, and attracting skilled labour to the inland region. 
 In addition to revealing the above insightful findings and their policy implications, 
this study also contributes to the international business literature by quantitatively modelling 
the effect of the China-specific decentralized institutional environment on the location choice 
of foreign investors in China. The empirical findings suggest that China is actually not a 
single united market, but the Chinese market is highly fragmented for foreign investors. In 
practice, such a fragmented Chinese market environment with the decentralized 
implementation of FDI policies may provide a high bargaining power for foreign investors 
relative to local governments because foreign investors can play Chinese local governments 
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off against each other in search of a favorable FDI policy at local level. As argued by 
Naughton (2007), however, strong inter-regional competition for attracting FDI among 
Chinese local governments may force foreign investors to navigate highly uncooperative and 
complex relationships between different regional or sectoral authorities, and this navigation 
can be costly for foreign investors. This important implication encourages foreign investors 
to pay more attention to a systematic approach in assessing the benefits and costs of their FDI 
location choices in the Chinese institutional context.  
 This study is limited by the aggregate FDI data stock at the provincial level. Due to 
this limitation, this study is only able to test the spatial externalities of inward FDI stock for 
the aggregate bundle of products and industries. Considering the incremental nature and 
diverse features of China’s industrial restructuring and FDI policies, further research should 
be directed at empirically distinguishing spatial externalities by product and industry levels 
across provinces when data at the further disaggregate level become available. However, the 
modelling framework of this research and the associated empirical testing methods are clearly 
applicable to similar data from other countries. Future research in this direction would be able 
to check the extent to which the findings of this research can be generalized. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix a,b               
 Label Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
              
1 itstockFDI )ln(  14.48 1.56 10.10 17.95 1.00                      
2 1,)ln( −tiStockFDI  8.31 1.39 4.42 11.48 0.94*** 1.00                      
3 itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅  15.36 0.58 14.29 16.83 0.51*** 0.35*** 1.00                    4 1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW  15.31 0.55 14.29 16.74 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.99*** 1.00                   
5 itGRPln  8.44 1.11 5.31 10.95 0.80*** 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 1.00                  
6 itPATENTln  8.60 1.54 4.82 13.07 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.94*** 1.00                 
7 itRAILln  0.24 0.84 -2.52 2.05 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.55*** 1.00                
8 itROADln  3.67 0.93 0.66 5.29 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.68*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 1.00               9 itEDUln  4.45 0.80 2.37 5.88 0.55*** 0.39*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.55*** 0.59***                             
Notes. a. N = 450. b. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2. Temporal and spatial adjustment and location determinants of inward FDI in China based on Eq. (6) 
                   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
                  
1,)ln( −tiStockFDI  0.636*** [0.047] 
0.756*** 
[0.038] 
0.793*** 
[0.052] 
0.814*** 
[0.054] 
0.669*** 
[0.048] 
0.734*** 
[0.061] 
0.857*** 
[0.053] 
0.844*** 
[0.049]           
itStockFDIW )ln( ⋅  -0.705** 
[0.326] 
-0.739** 
[0.287] 
-0.886** 
[0.382] 
-0.518** 
[0.226] 
    
         
1,)ln( −⋅ tiStockFDIW   
 
   -0.765** 
[0.319] 
-0.747** 
[0.280] 
-0.932*** 
[0.309] 
-0.534*** 
[0.190]          
itGRPln  0.452*** 
[0.079] 
0.235*** 
[0.044] 
  0.399*** 
[0.074] 
0.308*** 
[0.053] 
  
         
itPATENTln    0.214*** 
[0.059] 
0.131*** 
[0.041] 
  0.138** 
[0.052] 
0.108*** 
[0.038]          
itRAILln  0.123** 
[0.059] 
 0.108** 
[0.052] 
 0.123** 
[0.060] 
 0.112** 
[0.046] 
 
         
itROADln   0.216*** 
[0.047] 
 0.157** 
[0.061] 
 0.196** 
[0.083] 
 0.150*** 
[0.047] 
         
itEDUln  0.218** 
[0.103] 
0.165** 
[0.061] 
0.007 
[0.101] 
0.070 
[0.064] 
0.224** 
[0.091] 
0.185** 
[0.083] 
0.016 
[0.095] 
0.057 
[0.060]          
Constant 11.517** 
[5.114] 
11.740** 
[4.448] 
15.305** 
[5.932] 
8.934** 
[3.696] 
12.401** 
[5.144] 
11.420** 
[4.372] 
15.713*** 
[4.799] 
9.011*** 
[3.051]          
F-statistics 15598.00*** 38072.93*** 19305.77*** 10491.43*** 15842.78*** 34879.16*** 6226.46*** 80591.75***                   
Number of Instruments 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30          
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.247 0.292 0.361 0.207 0.157 0.274 0.146 0.239          
Difference-Hansen tests (p-value) 0.755 0.430 0.629 0.219 0.237 0.251 0.213 0.250          
AR(1) test in differences (p-value) 0.050 0.037 0.033 0.027 0.041 0.018 0.024 0.025          
AR(2) test in differences (p-value) 0.306 0.345 0.284 0.327 0.296 0.345 0.262 0.313                   
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Note. Numbers of observations: 450. Numbers in [ ] and ( ) are standardized errors and p-values respectively. *,** and ***denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and1% 
level respectively. Year dummies are not reported. 
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Notes 
 
1. The APEC member economies are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, China, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Russia, and Vietnam. 
 
2. Coastal region includes Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang, 
Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Hainan; Inland region includes Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Shaanxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia. 
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